As economic games have spread from experimental economics to other social 1 sciences, so too have critiques of their usefulness for drawing inferences about the "real world." 2 What these criticisms often miss is that games can be used to reveal individuals' private 3 preferences in ways that observational and interview data cannot; further, economic games can 4 be designed such that they do provide insights into real-world behavior. Here, we draw on our 5 collective experience using economic games in field contexts to illustrate how researchers can 6 strategically alter the framing or design of economic games to draw inferences about private-7 world or real-world preferences. A detailed case study from coastal Colombia provides an 8 example of the subtleties of game design and how games can be combined fruitfully with self-9 report data. We close with a list of concrete recommendations for how to modify economic 10 games to better match particular research questions and research contexts. 11
standardized and repeatable [3] [4] [5] . Given this initial emphasis on internal validity, it is perhaps 23 unsurprising that economic games have been criticized in economics for their lack of external 24 validity, or generalizability to situations beyond that of the experiment [3, 6] . As economic games 25 have made their way into the toolkits of other disciplines, such as anthropology and psychology, 26 this criticism has become more widespread [7] [8] [9] . Critics have argued that the rules and norms 27 that inspired classical economic games may not apply outside of large-scale market economies 28 [8, 9] or be relevant to theoretical questions beyond bargaining [3, 7] . More generally, there is an 29 increasing consensus that researchers should not use the standard suite of economic games just 30 because they are "standardized" [5] or "paradigmatic" [5,10]. 31 1 Though not all economic game studies are "experiments" in the strictest sense, involving the manipulation of an independent variable [79] , in principle games are experimental because they afford such manipulation. For example, researchers can test the effects of punishment on generosity [88] or compare anonymous and nonanonymous treatments (see relevant discussion in Section 2.2). Even without different treatments, economic games fit the less-stringent definitions of "experiments" in areas of psychology (see discussion in [89] ) and in experimental economics [24] . As such, we follow custom in experimental economics and refer to games as experiments here. 48 In most economic games, researchers provide participants with money, often the 49 equivalent of a day's wages or more, and ask them to decide how much to keep for themselves 50 and how much to allocate to third parties (the recipients). Under some experimental designs, 51 such as that of the Ultimatum Game (see [10] for a review), recipients can respond to the 52 decisions made by the focal participant (the decider); under others, such as that of the Dictator Experimental techniques, including economic games, are a useful tool for reducing the 134 effects of external constraints on behavior and attenuating social desirability biases. Allocation 135 games like the Dictator Game are particularly good at capturing private preferences because they 136 give deciders more agency than do games that allow recipients to respond [5, 40, 41] : when 137 making allocation decisions, deciders do not need to use their own resources, acquired outside 138 the experimental context [42] , nor anticipate how recipients [43] , third parties, or the researcher 139 will react to their decisions [15, 44] . 140 BGP and ACP have used two different allocation games to measure deciders' preferences 141 with respect to recipients with whom they only rarely interact. While rare interactions are 142 difficult to capture with observational data-as they may not take place during a field season- 143 or with interview data-as they may not be salient enough in the context of the interview to be 144 recalled and reported by participants [45,46]-experimental methods can allow researchers a 145 window into these infrequent encounters. Further, both BGP and ACP asked participants to make 146 their allocation decisions in private to minimize the risk of self-presentation bias. 147 BGP and colleagues used what they call a Random Allocation Game (RAG) [35] to test 148 whether moral values and belief in morally-concerned deities affect rule-following [36, [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] . 149 Deciders played two games. In one game, participants were presented with two cups, one 150 representing an anonymous same-community co-ethnic, co-religionist individual, and one 151 representing a geographically-distant co-ethnic, co-religionist individual. In the other game, the 152 cups represented the decider (self) and a separate co-ethnic, co-religious individual from the 153 same distant community. Researchers presented deciders with 30 coins and a fair, six-sided die 154 with three sides of one color and three sides of another. They asked deciders to mentally choose a cup and a color, then to roll the die 30 times in private, without the researcher watching; if the 156 chosen color was rolled, deciders were told to put a coin into their chosen cup, and if the other 157 color was rolled, they were told to put the coin into the other cup ( Figure 2 ). If deciders did not 158 break game rules to put more coins in one cup instead of the other, half of the 30 coins would 159 end up in each cup on average. Because decisions were made in private and recipients could not 
die. All money left in each cup was distributed to one randomly-selected individual described
169 on that cup (e.g., someone from the same community, same religion, and same ethnic group). 170 Studying individuals' preferences for out-group vs. in-group relationships, ACP and 171 Michael Gurven used an experimental paradigm in which recipients were strangers, but members of either the decider's ethnolinguistic/religious group or a different ethnolinguistic/religious 173 group [29] . Members of one of the three Bolivian populations with whom ACP collaborates, the 174 Tsimane', have minimal access to roads or to cheap river transportation; because of this, 175 Tsimane' individuals have only infrequent interactions with members of other ethnolinguistic 176 groups [28] , making these interactions difficult to capture via observational study designs. 177 Further, when intergroup interactions do occur, the Tsimane' often self-report suffering 178 discrimination [52] . Given the rarity of intergroup interactions, ACP attempted to approximate a 179 first-time interaction across group boundaries using a non-anonymous allocation game: deciders 180 were simultaneously presented with photos of in-group and out-group strangers and learned the 181 name and group membership of each ( Figure 3) ; recipients learned the first and last name and 182 group membership of those who gave them money. Tsimane' deciders were 60% less likely to 183 give a coin to a recipient from a group they perceived as having good market access, allocating 184 more money to other Tsimane' recipients instead [29] . In post-game interviews, deciders 185 frequently indicated that they preferred to allocate coins to recipients who were in greater need, 186 consistent with the common view among the Tsimane' that the Tsimane' have fewer resources 187 than other ethnolinguistic groups in Bolivia [29] . A study based only on observational and self-188 report data might simply attribute the infrequent interactions between the Tsimane' and other 189 ethnic groups to discrimination or lack of mobility. While both of these factors may play a role, 190 this experimental paradigm reveals that Tsimane' preferences may also be influenced by need, 191 such that they prefer to channel money toward those they feel need it most-other Tsimane'. conflated with the private-world approach: just as private-world research is critiqued for not approximating the real world (Section 2.1), real-world research is critiqued for inadequately 210 testing theory (see [4] for discussion), even though that is not what it is designed to test. 211 To understand how individual characteristics structure real-world social relationships on 212 the island of Yasawa in Fiji, MMG developed three Recipient Identity-Conditioned Heuristics 213 (RICH) games [12] . In these games, researchers present deciders with a photo array of same-214 community members ( Figure 4 ). In an allocation game, researchers give deciders coins and 215 deciders must choose how to allocate these coins across recipients, including themselves; in a 216 taking game, researchers distribute coins across recipient photos and deciders must choose 217 whether or not to take coins from the recipients; and in a costly reduction game, deciders are 218 given coins and must choose whether or not to pay to reduce the total amount a recipient 219 receives. RICH games reveal how a decider's preferences to give to, exploit, or punish a particular 220 recipient reflect the decider's characteristics (e.g., their resources), the recipient's characteristics 221 (e.g., their reputation), and properties of the dyad (e.g., kinship, friendship).
Figure 3 | Setup of the experiment in Bolivia, with simultaneous presentation of photos of in-
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A. 229 [12] . 230 When playing these games in Fiji, almost all participants provided rationales for their 231 decisions that were consistent with MMG's observational work, including a desire to help the 232 "weak" and punish "moneyheads." Further, parallels between the games and the real world were 233 not lost on participants. In debriefing interviews, participants were two-to-three times as likely 234 to relate RICH games to their daily lives as were participants in neighboring communities who punitiveness not observed in anonymous-recipient games; as decisions were confidential, 240 punitiveness also exceeded that expected from ethnographic observations. 241 While designed to tap nominally distinct motives to help (the allocation game), exploit 242 (the taking game), and punish at a cost (the costly reduction game), the different RICH games 243 also differ subtly in their parameters. For example, in the allocation game, deciders do not have 244 enough coins to give to all recipients, but in the taking game, deciders can choose to leave 245 already-distributed coins on every photo so that all recipients receive some. In other words, the 246 games entail different degrees of resource constraint. Such subtle differences in experimental 247 design can affect the degree to which participants can exhibit real-world or private-world 248 preferences. We illustrate this below with RICH games data CRT collected in Colombia. Figure 5 ). 265 Social relationships help individuals buffer the resource shocks associated with poverty and the 266 resettlement resulting from forced displacement. Reported resource sharing networks are 267 similar in structure to friendship networks, indicating that giving is generally structured by social 268 closeness, kinship, and distance between households. Note, however, that a fraction of inter-269 ethnic resource transfer ties may have been missed; some Afrocolombians reported making small 270 transfers of food or money to Emberá community residents who asked for these transfers, but 271 whose names the Afrocolombians did not know (cf. Figure 5) . The real-world resource transfer network data show that all else equal, resources 320 preferentially flow from haves to have-nots: elderly, depressed, and food-insecure individuals 321 are less likely to make resource transfers to others (presumably due to personal need), and those 322 individuals with high grip-strength are less likely to receive incoming transfers from others 323 (presumably due to higher physical status and less need). A similar pattern also holds in the 324 economic game data, but important differences emerge because constraints on behavior are 325 experimentally relaxed. In the allocation and taking games, food insecure and depressed 326 individuals are just as likely as everyone else to make transfers to others. By ensuring that these 327 individuals have resources (coins) that they can transfer to-or leave for-others if they wish, 328 RICH games permit deciders to act in accordance with their private preferences. 329 Even more apparent are the effects of recipient characteristics as resource constraints are 330 experimentally lifted. In the allocation game, deciders prefer to transfer coins to those individuals 331 who are unable to work. As resource constraints are relaxed further in the taking game, we see 332 preferences to leave coins for those individuals who cannot work, individuals with food 333 insecurity, and indigenous individuals (who generally are, and are perceived to be, living under 334 tougher circumstances). Moreover, in the taking game, deciders prefer to take coins from those 335 high in material wealth and those with high grip strength. Similar patterns abound in the costly 336 reduction game, where elderly, food insecure, and indigenous individuals are less likely to be 337 punished, and individuals with high material wealth are more likely to be punished (see also [60] ). 338 In the "real world," where agency is constrained, cases where the poor or weak punish the 339 wealthy or strong might be rare and thus harder to detect with observational methods. In sum, 340 these findings show that relaxation of constraints on behavior can allow individuals increasing agency with which to act on their private preferences. The extent to which individuals in this data 342 set prefer to help marginalized members of their community would be overlooked by restricting 343 the study design to real-world transfers alone. 344 In general, RICH games have shown high ecological validity: that is, they map onto the 345 same dyadic variables that structure empirical resource transfers. However, they also provide 346 deciders with more freedom to act on their private-world preferences, at least when the game 347 parameters are set such that they relax real-world constraints, like resource availability. CTR 348 clarified this pattern in post-game interviews: the majority of respondents, even those in relative 349 marginalization, saw the allocation game and especially the taking game as an opportunity to "do 350 the right thing" and give to those most in need (see also [12] The four studies discussed above are not flawless examples of how to best use economic games, 358 but they are instructive. We have learned from their shortcomings and surprises, and these 359 lessons may be useful for others who wish to use economic games to measure private-world or 360 real-world preferences. As we identified in Section 1, some primary considerations for 361 researchers running economic games should be: 1) the match between research questions and 362 experimental design, 2) the extent to which researchers wish to make inferences about real-world versus private-world preferences, and 3) whether the experimental task will be 364 comprehensible to participants-which is especially relevant when exporting an economic game 365 from one cultural context to another. We highlight different strategies for addressing these 366 considerations below. We also discuss these strategies in light of replicability, emphasizing the 367 importance of conceptual replication. of free money for game play, consider designing the game such that deciders are required to earn 399 the money they give away (see [76] for useful discussion). 400 By establishing a principled means of quantitatively or qualitatively measuring the focal 401 context, it becomes easier to compare experimental results to participants' real-world behavior. appropriate to test your research question. For example, to make the game relevant for 429 participants, you may find it helpful to use a currency other than money (e.g., [77, 78] ). Further, 430 the more you know about the community, the better you will be able to interpret your results- we recommend piloting with members of a different community, but one similar to the focal 444 community in the parameters of interest (e.g., living in the same region, growing the same crops, 445 composed of people with similar ethnic backgrounds, with similar rates of migration, etc.). 446 Piloting in the focal community may not be desirable if (1) you intend to interview every 447 household in the community (as did CTR and MMG), or (2) you fear that participants may talk to 448 one another about your game before they play (ACP's concern; see [68,81] for similar concerns). 449 Per (2), consider a pilot community that interacts infrequently with the focal community (ACP 450 picked communities living on different roads in the same region). populations, such as those that are less market integrated and predominantly interact with known individuals, not with strangers [7, 9] . While designing games to enhance their local 470 relevance, as we have recommended here, may boost their ecological validity [12, 72] , these 471 alterations undercut strict replicability. Nonetheless, economic games tailored to particular 472 contexts lend themselves to "conceptual replications": if researchers have an a priori reason to 473 think that participants' decisions will vary in a specific way, or will not vary, across different 474 contexts, these theoretical predictions can be rigorously tested by triangulation, using slightly 475 different methodological approaches across sites [86] . In other words, the economic games we 
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Figure 4 | Illustrations of decisions in progress for the (A) allocation, (B) taking, and (C) costly
reduction RICH games; photos are of same-community individuals. Adapted from
